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53 quotes · Aurelius · Epictetus · Seneca

Quotes on perspective

Marcus Aurelius taught himself a trick he called the view from above — to picture his own life from high enough up that its small dramas settled back into their small proportions. Seneca used distance in time instead of space: will this matter in a year? In ten? These are the lines for the moments when a problem has swallowed the whole sky and you need the sky back.

Quotes on perspective

  1. A noble way of thinking is to look at human things as if thou wert looking at them from some lofty place; flocks, armies, husbandry, marriages, dissolutions, births, deaths, the noise of courts, desert places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, mournings, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly combination of contraries.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 7.48·trans. Long
  2. He who has learned to die has unlearned slavery; he is above any external power, or, at any rate, he is beyond it. What terrors have prisons and bonds and bars for him? His way out is clear.
    Seneca·Letter 99.10·trans. Gummere
  3. It is difficulties that show what men are. Therefore, when a difficulty falls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with a rough young man. For what purpose? you may say. That you may become an Olympic conqueror; but it is not accomplished without sweat.
    Epictetus·Discourses 1.24.1·trans. Long
  4. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 2.17·trans. Long
  5. Though thou shouldst be going to live three thousand years, and as many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this which he now loses. The longest and the shortest are thus brought to the same.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 2.14·trans. Long
  6. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores, and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man retire than into his own soul.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 4.3·trans. Long
  7. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 8.47·trans. Long
  8. Do not seek for things to happen the way you want them to; rather, wish that what happens happen the way it happens: then you will be happy.
    Epictetus·Enchiridion 8·trans. Long
  9. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but of the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the same time, however, take care that thou dost not, through being so pleased with them, accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 7.27·trans. Long
  10. That which is not good for the bee-hive cannot be good for the bees.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 6.54·trans. Long
  11. There are more things, Lucilius, likely to frighten us than there are to crush us; we suffer more often in imagination than in reality.
    Seneca·Letter 13.4·trans. Gummere
  12. Anger, the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions. For the other emotions have in them some element of peace and calm, while this one is wholly violent and has its being in an onrush of resentment, raging with a most inhuman lust for weapons, blood, and punishment, giving no thought to itself if only it can hurt another.
    Seneca·On Anger 1.1·trans. Gummere
  13. No man is crushed by misfortune unless he has first been deceived by prosperity.
    Seneca·Letter 67.10·trans. Gummere
  14. When any person does ill by you, or speaks ill of you, remember that he acts or speaks from an opinion that it is right for him so to do. Now, it is not possible for him to follow what appears right to you, but what appears right to himself.
    Epictetus·Enchiridion 42·trans. Long
  15. How much more grievous are the consequences of anger than the causes of it.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 11.18·trans. Long
  16. Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible, be daily before your eyes; but most of all death: and you will never think of anything mean nor will you desire anything extravagantly.
    Epictetus·Enchiridion 21·trans. Long
  17. Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busy-body, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good, that it is beautiful, and of the bad, that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me, cannot be injured by any of them.
    Marcus Aurelius·Meditations 2.1·trans. Long
  18. Natural desires are limited; but those which spring from false opinion can have no stopping-point. The false has no limits. When you are travelling on a road, there must be an end; but when astray, your wanderings are limitless. Recall your steps, therefore, from idle things, and when you would know whether that which you seek is based upon a natural or upon a misleading desire, consider whether it can stop at any definite point. If you find, after having travelled far, that there is a more distant goal always in view, you may be sure that this condition is contrary to nature. Farewell. ↑ i.e., have merely advanced in years. ↑ Frag. 201 Usener.
    Seneca·Letter 16 — On Philosophy, the Guide of Life (§9)·trans. Gummere
  19. Words should be scattered like seed; no matter how small the seed may be, if it has once found favourable ground, it unfolds its strength and from an insignificant thing spreads to its greatest growth. Reason grows in the same way; it is not large to the outward view, but increases as it does its work. Few words are spoken; but if the mind has truly caught them, they come into their strength and spring up. Yes, precepts and seeds have the same quality; they produce much, and yet they are slight things. Only, as I said, let a favourable mind receive and assimilate them. Then of itself the mind also will produce bounteously in its turn, giving back more than it has received. Farewell.
    Seneca·Letter 38 — On Quiet Conversation (§2)·trans. Gummere
  20. If ever you have come upon a grove that is full of ancient trees which have grown to an unusual height, shutting out a view of the sky by a veil of pleached and intertwining branches, then the loftiness of the forest, the seclusion of the spot, and your marvel at the thick unbroken shade in the midst of the open spaces, will prove to you the presence of deity. Or if a cave, made by the deep crumbling of the rocks, holds up a mountain on its arch, a place not built with hands but hollowed out into such spaciousness by natural causes, your soul will be deeply moved by a certain intimation of the existence of God.
    Seneca·Letter 41 — On the God Within Us (§3)·trans. Gummere
  21. I shall mention a fact by which you may weigh the worth of a man’s character: you will scarcely find anyone who can live with his door wide open. It is our conscience, not our pride, that has put doorkeepers at our doors; we live in such a fashion that being suddenly disclosed to view is equivalent to being caught in the act. What profits it, however, to hide ourselves away, and to avoid the eyes and ears of men?
    Seneca·Letter 43 — On the Relativity of Fame (§4)·trans. Gummere
  22. I could not describe the villa accurately; for I am familiar only with the front of the house, and with the parts which are in public view and can be seen by the mere passer-by. There are two grottoes, which cost a great deal of labour, as big as the most spacious hall, made by hand.
    Seneca·Letter 55 — On Vatia’s Villa (§6)·trans. Gummere
  23. Accordingly, there are five causes, as Plato says: the material, the agent, the make-up, the model, and the end in view. Last comes the result of all these. Just as in the case of the statue,—to go back to the figure with which we began,—the material is the bronze, the agent is the artist, the make-up is the form which is adapted to the material, the model is the pattern imitated by the agent, the end in view is the purpose in the maker’s mind, and, finally, the result of all these is the statue itself.
    Seneca·Letter 65 — On the First Cause (§8)·trans. Gummere
  24. There you have its outward appearance, if it should ever come under a single view and show itself once in all its completeness. But there are many aspects of it. They unfold themselves according as life varies and as actions differ; but virtue itself does not become less or greater. For the Supreme Good cannot diminish, nor may virtue retrograde; rather is it transformed, now into one quality and now into another, shaping itself according to the part which it is to play.
    Seneca·Letter 66 — On Various Aspects of Virtue (§7)·trans. Gummere
  25. Mortal things decay, fall, are worn out, grow up, are exhausted, and replenished. Hence, in their case, in view of the uncertainty of their lot, there is inequality; but of things divine the nature is one.
    Seneca·Letter 66 — On Various Aspects of Virtue (§12)·trans. Gummere
  26. This can be proved to you by the fact that the good man will hasten unhesitatingly to any noble deed; even though he be confronted by the hangman, the torturer, and the stake, he will persist, regarding not what he must suffer, but what he must do; and he will entrust himself as readily to an honourable deed as he would to a good man; he will consider it advantageous to himself, safe, propitious. And he will hold the same view concerning an honourable deed, even though it be fraught with sorrow and hardship, as concerning a good man who is poor or wasting away in exile.
    Seneca·Letter 66 — On Various Aspects of Virtue (§21)·trans. Gummere
  27. Certain animals hide themselves from discovery by confusing the marks of their foot-prints in the neighbourhood of their lairs. You should do the same. Otherwise, there will always be someone dogging your footsteps. Many men pass by that which is visible, and peer after things hidden and concealed; a locked room invites the thief. Things which lie in the open appear cheap; the house-breaker passes by that which is exposed to view. This is the way of the world, and the way of all ignorant men: they crave to burst in upon hidden things. It is therefore best not to vaunt one’s retirement.
    Seneca·Letter 68 — On Wisdom and Retirement (§4)·trans. Gummere
  28. Would that in earlier days you had been minded to follow this purpose! Would that we were not discussing the happy life in plain view of death! But even now let us have no delay. For now we can take the word of experience, which tells us that there are many superfluous and hostile things; for this we should long since have taken the word of reason.
    Seneca·Letter 68 — On Wisdom and Retirement (§12)·trans. Gummere
  29. You need not, therefore, wonder that goods are equal, both those which are to be deliberately chosen, and those which circumstances have imposed. For if you once adopt the view that they are unequal, deeming, for instance, a brave endurance of torture as among the lesser goods, you will be including it among the evils also; you will pronounce Socrates unhappy in his prison, Cato unhappy when he reopens his wounds with more courage than he showed in inflicting them, and Regulus the most ill-starred of all when he pays the penalty for keeping his word even with his enemies.
    Seneca·Letter 71 — On the Supreme Good (§17)·trans. Gummere
  30. The earlier Academics do indeed admit that a man is happy even amid such tortures, but do not admit that he is completely or fully happy. With this view we cannot in any wise agree; for unless a man is happy, he has not attained the Supreme Good; and the good which is supreme admits of no higher degree, if only virtue exists within this man, and if adversity does not impair his virtue, and if, though the body be injured, the virtue abides unharmed. And it does abide. For I understand virtue to be high-spirited and exalted, so that it is aroused by anything that molests it.
    Seneca·Letter 71 — On the Supreme Good (§18)·trans. Gummere
  31. If, however, you accept the view that there is anything good besides that which is honourable, all the virtues will suffer. For it will never be possible for any virtue to be won and held, if there is anything outside itself which virtue must take into consideration. If there is any such thing, then it is at variance with reason, from which the virtues spring, and with truth also, which cannot exist without reason. Any opinion, however, which is at variance with truth, is wrong.
    Seneca·Letter 76 — On Learning Wisdom in Old Age (§22)·trans. Gummere
  32. Suddenly there came into our view to-day the “Alexandrian” ships,—I mean those which are usually sent ahead to announce the coming of the fleet; they are called “mail-boats.” The Campanians are glad to see them; all the rabble of Puteoli stand on the docks, and can recognize the “Alexandrian” boats, no matter how great the crowd of vessels, by the very trim of their sails. For they alone may keep spread their topsails, which all ships use when out at sea,
    Seneca·Letter 77 — On Taking One’s Own Life (§1)·trans. Gummere
  33. Virtue is never lost to view; and yet to have been lost to view is no loss. There will come a day which will reveal her, though hidden away or suppressed by the spite of her contemporaries.
    Seneca·Letter 79 — On the Rewards of Scientific Discovery (§17)·trans. Gummere
  34. When the strength of wine has become too great and has gained control over the mind, every lurking evil comes forth from its hiding-place. Drunkenness does not create vice, it merely brings it into view; at such times the lustful man does not wait even for the privacy of a bedroom, but without postponement gives free play to the demands of his passions; at such times the unchaste man proclaims and publishes his malady; at such times your cross-grained fellow does not restrain his tongue or his hand. The haughty man increases his arrogance, the ruthless man his cruelty, the slanderer his spitefulness. Every vice is given free play and comes to the front.
    Seneca·Letter 83 — On Drunkenness (§20)·trans. Gummere
  35. They say, “The wise man is called unperturbed in the sense in which pomegranates are called mellow—not that there is no hardness at all in their seeds, but that the hardness is less than it was before.” That view is wrong; for I am not referring to the gradual weeding out of evils in a good man, but to the complete absence of evils; there should be in him no evils at all, not even any small ones. For if there are any, they will grow, and as they grow will hamper him. Just as a large and complete cataract wholly blinds the eyes, so a medium-sized cataract dulls their vision.
    Seneca·Letter 85 — On Some Vain Syllogisms (§5)·trans. Gummere
  36. I come next to the person who boasts his knowledge of the heavenly bodies, who knows Whither the chilling star of Saturn hides, And through what orbit Mercury doth stray. Of what benefit will it be to know this? That I shall be disturbed because Saturn and Mars are in opposition, or when Mercury sets at eventide in plain view of Saturn, rather than learn that those stars, wherever they are, are propitious, and that they are not subject to change?
    Seneca·Letter 88 — On Liberal and Vocational Studies (§14)·trans. Gummere
  37. Let me tell you what evils are due to over-nice exactness, and what an enemy it is of truth! Protagoras declares that one can take either side on any question and debate it with equal success—even on this very question, whether every subject can be debated from either point of view. Nausiphanes holds that in things which seem to exist, there is no difference between existence and non-existence.
    Seneca·Letter 88 — On Liberal and Vocational Studies (§43)·trans. Gummere
  38. What is the happy life? It is peace of mind, and lasting tranquillity. This will be yours if you possess greatness of soul; it will be yours if you possess the steadfastness that resolutely clings to a good judgment just reached. How does a man reach this condition? By gaining a complete view of truth, by maintaining, in all that he does, order, measure, fitness, and a will that is inoffensive and kindly, that is intent upon reason and never departs therefrom, that commands at the same time love and admiration. In short, to give you the principle in brief compass, the wise man’s soul ought to be such as would be proper for a god.
    Seneca·Letter 92 (§3)·trans. Gummere
  39. Though by means of reason he can lead a life which will not bring regrets, yet there resides in this imperfect creature, man, a certain power that makes for badness, because he possesses a mind which is easily moved to perversity. Suppose, however, the badness which is in full view, and has previously been stirred to activity, to be removed; the man is still not a good man, but he is being moulded to goodness. One, however, in whom there is lacking any quality that makes for goodness, is bad.
    Seneca·Letter 92 (§29)·trans. Gummere
  40. Those who urge the view that this department is superfluous argue as follows: “If an object that is held in front of the eyes interferes with the vision, it must be removed. For just as long as it is in the way, it is a waste of time to offer such precepts as these: ‘Walk thus and so; extend your hand in that direction.
    Seneca·Letter 94 (§5)·trans. Gummere
  41. Or, if precepts do not avail at all, then every method of instruction should be abolished, and we should be content with Nature alone. Those who maintain this view do not understand that one man is lively and alert of wit, another sluggish and dull, while certainly some men have more intelligence than others. The strength of the wit is nourished and kept growing by precepts; it adds new points of view to those which are inborn and corrects depraved ideas.
    Seneca·Letter 94 (§30)·trans. Gummere
  42. This view, I maintain, is not at variance with the principles of our school, if it be so explained. And why? Because the first and worst penalty for sin is to have committed sin; and crime, though Fortune deck it out with her favours, though she protect and take it in her charge, can never go unpunished; since the punishment of crime lies in the crime itself. But none the less do these second penalties press close upon the heels of the first—constant fear, constant terror, and distrust in one’s own security. Why, then, should I set wickedness free from such a punishment? Why should I not always leave it trembling in the balance?
    Seneca·Letter 97 — On the Degeneracy of the Age (§14)·trans. Gummere
  43. All these things have a view to conduct, and therefore they have been inserted under the proper topic. But the remarks of dialecticians in opposition to this idea had to be sifted out, and were accordingly laid aside. Now that you demand an answer to them all, I shall examine all their statements, and then refute them singly.
    Seneca·Letter 102 — On the Intimations of Our Immortality (§5)·trans. Gummere
  44. Then the retort is: “What! Would you define reputation as the esteem of one individual, and ill-repute as the rancorous chatter of one man? Glory, too, we take to be more widespread, for it demands the agreement of many men.” But the position of the “many” is different from that of “the one.” And why? Because, if the good man thinks well of me, it practically amounts to my being thought well of by all good men; for they will all think the same, if they know me. Their judgment is alike and identical; the effect of truth on it is equal. They cannot disagree, which means that they would all hold the same view, being unable to hold different views.
    Seneca·Letter 102 — On the Intimations of Our Immortality (§12)·trans. Gummere
  45. And you can avoid the envious hopes of the wicked so long as you have nothing which can stir the evil desires of others, and so long as you possess nothing remarkable. For people crave even little things, if these catch the attention or are of rare occurrence. You will escape envy if you do not force yourself upon the public view, if you do not boast your possessions, if you understand how to enjoy things privately. Hatred comes either from running foul of others: and this can be avoided by never provoking anyone; or else it is uncalled for: and common-sense will keep you safe from it. Yet it has been dangerous to many; some people have been hated without having had an enemy.
    Seneca·Letter 105 — On Facing the World with Confidence (§3)·trans. Gummere
  46. Where there is an evil conscience something may bring safety, but nothing can bring ease; for a man imagines that, even if he is not under arrest, he may soon be arrested. His sleep is troubled; when he speaks of another man’s crime, he reflects upon his own, which seems to him not sufficiently blotted out, not sufficiently hidden from view. A wrongdoer sometimes has the luck to escape notice but never the assurance thereof. Farewell. ↑ i.e., tact.
    Seneca·Letter 105 — On Facing the World with Confidence (§8)·trans. Gummere
  47. Let us live thus, and speak thus; let Fate find us ready and alert. Here is your great soul—the man who has given himself over to Fate; on the other hand, that man is a weakling and a degenerate who struggles and maligns the order of the universe and would rather reform the gods than reform himself. Farewell. ↑ Vergil, Aen. vi. 274 f. ↑ Cleanthes, Frag. 527 von Arnim. In Epictetus (Ench. 53) these verses are assigned to Cleanthes (omitting the last line); while St. Augustine (Civ. Dei. v. 8) quotes them as Seneca’s: Annaei Senecae sunt, nisi fallor, hi versus. Wilamowitz and others follow the latter view.
    Seneca·Letter 107 — On Obedience to the Universal Will (§12)·trans. Gummere
  48. therefore, while holding to your own view, keep the whole question in abeyance in your mind. If the theory is true, it is a mark of purity to refrain from eating flesh; if it be false, it is economy. And what harm does it do to you to give such credence? I am merely depriving you of food which sustains lions and vultures.”
    Seneca·Letter 108 — On the Approaches to Philosophy (§21)·trans. Gummere
  49. They say that men see farther in the affairs of others than in their own. A defect of character causes this in those who are blinded by self-love, and whose fear in the hour of peril takes away their clear view of that which is useful; it is when a man is more at ease and freed from fear that he will begin to be wise. Nevertheless, there are certain matters where even wise men see the facts more clearly in the case of others than in their own. Moreover, the wise man will, in company with his fellow sage, confirm the truth of that most sweet and honourable proverb—“always desiring and always refusing the same things”: it will be a noble result when they draw the load “with equal yoke.”
    Seneca·Letter 109 — On the Fellowship of Wise Men (§16)·trans. Gummere
  50. Conversely, we shall get a view of evil and the deadening influences of a sorrow-laden soul—in spite of the hindrance that results from the widespread gleam of riches that flash round about, and in spite of the false light—of official position on the one side or great power on the other—which beats pitilessly upon the beholder.
    Seneca·Letter 115 — On the Superficial Blessings (§7)·trans. Gummere
  51. You will be fabricating much trouble for me, and you will be unconsciously embroiling me in a great discussion, and in considerable bother, if you put such petty questions as these; for in settling them I cannot disagree with my fellow-Stoics without impairing my standing among them, nor can I subscribe to such ideas without impairing my conscience. Your query is, whether the Stoic belief is true: that wisdom is a Good, but that being wise is not a Good. I shall first set forth the Stoic view, and then I shall be bold enough to deliver my own opinion.
    Seneca·Letter 117 — On Real Ethics as Superior to Syllogistic Subtleties (§1)·trans. Gummere
  52. I myself do not hold the same view, and I judge that our philosophers have come down to this argument because they are already bound by the first link in the chain and for that reason may not alter their definition. People are wont to concede much to the things which all men take for granted; in our eyes the fact that all men agree upon something is a proof of its truth.
    Seneca·Letter 117 — On Real Ethics as Superior to Syllogistic Subtleties (§6)·trans. Gummere
  53. This is what I mean: Some believe the Good to be that which is useful; they accordingly bestow this title upon riches, horses, wine, and shoes; so cheaply do they view the Good, and to such base uses do they let it descend. They regard as honourable that which agrees with the principle of right conduct —such as taking dutiful care of an old father, relieving a friend’s poverty, showing bravery on a campaign, and uttering prudent and well-balanced opinions.
    Seneca·Letter 120 — More About Virtue (§2)·trans. Gummere